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AUTHENTICATION WITHOUT SECRECY 
TERRY C. JONES AND JENNIFER SEBERRY 
ABSTRACT. Re~eDtly, ~berry proposed a method for Bubliminal meB~ 
tran~missioll over an insecure channel in the ease where a.uthentication but 
not secrecy is required. Here we examine her ide8.11 in some detail, and 
propose certain changes to the method that would be necessary for imple-
mentation. 
Introduction. 
The most commonly cited example of a situation requiring authen-
ticity without secrecy is that described by Simmons [4J wherein "Two 
mutually deceitful and distrusting parties" (countries) wish to place un-
derground listening devices in each others territory to monitor compli-
ance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In short, the host country requires 
that all outgoing messages be openly readable in order to check the accu-
racy of the device and ensure that no other information is transmitted, 
while the monitoring country requires strong authentication of the re-
ceived messages to be convinced that innocuous reports have not been 
substituted for incriminating ones (or vice-versa). 
Simmons [4:] has discussed the general authentication without secrecy 
problem using two key cryptographic methods. It was also Simmons [3, 
4:) who suggested the possible transmission in an authentication system 
of a subliminal message. Imagine an authentication system such as that 
described above, where more than one choice of key could be used to 
(correctly) authenticate a given message. If the key that was used is 
recoverable by the receiver, then additional infonnation may be conveyed 
by the choice of key. Simmons showed how this could be done in the 
simple case where two keys could be used to authenticate a message, 
and the recovery of the key used would provide one bit of subliminal 
message. 
Seberry [2] has shown how these ideas could be incorporated into an 
authentication without secrecy environment employing Shamir's knap-
sack based signature method for authentication. In Shamir's method 
[1], for every message transmitted, a random binary vector R is chosen 
to add to the security of the system, and Seberry shows a method by 
which the chosen R may be recovered by the receiver. 
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Under this system, to send II message M, M is converted to Ilk-bit 
binary number, and the sender chooses II modulus n, and II random 
k x 2k matrix H. A 2k x 1 matrix A is then computed such that 
HA= [1,2,4, ... ,2k- 1]T(modn). 
To provide additional security, II random 1 x 2k binary vector R is also 
chosen for each meggage. An authentication vector O2 is then fonned 
for M in the following way. The sender forms 
M'~M-RA 
C· ~ (REV (M'))H 
02 =G'+R 
where REV (M) is the binary representation of M' written backwards. 
The vector 02 is the authenticator for M and the pair (M, O2 ) is trans-
mitted. Authentication by the receiver is performed by checking that 
C2 A = M, and recovery of R is possible by solving C2B = RB(modn) 
given 02 and the superincreasing B. 
This system, as proposed by Seberry has several shortcomings which 
we will now attempt to resolve. 
The value of the modulus (n). 
We have found that the value of the modulus, n, cannot be chosen 
quite as arbitrarily as was thought. H n is chosen to have more than 
k bits, then there will be messages such that M' 2:: 2", making the 
multiplication M H impossible, since M' will have more than k bits and 
hence REV (M) will be a vector with length greater than k. 
We need to enforce the condition that n < 2". An instance of the 
method going wrong when this is not enforced occurs in Seberry's ex-
ample where the message 1 is to be transmitted and R is chosen as 
(0 1 0 0], since here, with n = 5 and k = 2, M' = 1 - 2 = 4 (mod 5), a 
number with k + 1 bits (1002), and hence REV (M') is (0 0 I]. 
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The recovery of (the subliminal) R. 
Following message reception, the R that was used to form the authen· 
ticator 02 is recovered as the solution of OlB = RB (modn). Seberry 
proposed that B be chosen 8.8 a superincreasing 2k x 1 vector to facil-
itate simple recovery of R. We have since discovered that maJcing R 
superincreasing does not aid in this as much as was hoped. 
If the system were implemented as it stands, the message receiver 
would have to solve RB = s (modn) for 8 = 02B. Were there no 
considerations of modulus, the superincreasingness of B would make the 
solution trivial. Given the existence of the modulm, and the condition 
n < 2"', our problem is to find solutions to the system of equations 
RB=ll+an (a=1,2,3, ... ,p) where 
8 + pn ~ Ehi < s(p + l)n (hi in B) and 
p ~ fioo,((Eb; - ')In). 
floor(x) represents the integer part of the number x. The maximum 
number of solutions for R satisfying RB = II (modn) is p. Not all of 
these equations need have a solution. An example will make this clearer. 
Consider the system with the following parameters 
then, 
k=3 n=5 
A ~[2 2 2 2 4 I[T, B ~ [I 24918 40[ 
[2 2 4 I 3 I[ 
H ~[4 4 I I 0 2[ M ~ 3 R ~ [0 I I 0 I I[ 
[434220[ 
M'~M-RA 
~ '(!nod 5) 
c' ~ (REV (M'llH 
~ [0 0 1112 24 I 3 I[ 
[44 II 0 2[ 
1434220[ 
~[434220[ 
02=C'+R 
~ 14 4 0 2 3 I[ 
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Then, on reception of (3, [4 4 0 2 3 11), to authenticate M = 3, the 
receiver computes G2A = 33 (mod 5) = 3 (mod 5) = M, and to recover 
R, solves G2B = RB mod 5 = 4(mod 5). I 
So, the receiver must solve each of 
RB~4 
RB = 4 + 5 
RB ~ 4 + (2 x 5) 
RB ~ 4 + (14 x 5). 
In this case, the solution set is found to be 
R ={OO1OOO, 000100, 101100, 100010, 011010, 010110, 111110, 
001001, 000101, 101101, 100011, 011011, 010111, 111111} 
note that we get 14 solutions to our 15 equations, RB = 39 having no 
solution. 
The solutions for R such that RB = 8 will form a class. Let the 
class corresponding to the solutions for RB = 8 be named S (where 
S ~ ,(mod n)). 
Seberry suggests reauthentication to resolve which of the elements 
of the class was the one used for the generation of the received 02' 
That is, reauthenticate the received message with each R in class S 
until the authenticator O2 is obtained. Clearly this procedure will be 
unacceptable in terms of time taken to recover R if there happen to be 
a large number of elements in S. 
A solution. 
Ideally we would like to preserve the structure of the system as far 
as possible, since it allows for the sending of such a large subliminal 
message (twice the size as the message M). There are two approaches 
that spring to mind that could be taken to achieve this. Both are aimed 
at reducing the number of elements in classes. 
The first approach is to try to minimise the average number of ele-
ments in each class, and thus make the system as fast as it could be {on 
average}. How fast would this be'! We have 221;; elements to distribute 
among n classes. The average number in a class will therefore be 221: In. 
To minimise this number we must maximise n, (i.e., n = 21: - 1) giv-
ing 2" classes, or an average of 2" elements per class in the best case. 
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From this we see immediately that the system is unacceptable, as was 
hinted at in the previow section, since the time taken to recover R rises 
exponentially with the length of the message. 
A second approach would be to try to'choose the parameters (B and 
n) for the system in such a way that a large number of classes contained 
only a small number (> 0) of elements, and allow the bulk of the elements 
to be spread among the remaining few classes. That this cannot be done 
we have been unable to prove, but simulations run on a VAX 11/180 
have not provided examples where it is possible. It has been suggested 
that the proof of this follow some group theoretical or Central Limit 
Theorem approach. H it were possible, then it may prove preferable to 
the solution we now propose. 
Given that we cannot restrict the number of elements falling into 
the classes in either of the above ways, it is suggested that the class 
into which the authenticator C2 falls constitute the subliminal mes-
sage. Although this reduces the amount of subliminal information that 
is conveyed by a k-bit message from 2k-bits to k-bits (in the case where 
n = 2k - 1), we feel that this is still ample. However, we DOW have the 
important advantage that the recovery of the subliminal message has 
been made as fast as the authentication procedure itself. 
Here, since we know C2B = RB (mod n), the sender just chooses R 
such that RB = ~ (mod n) for a subliminal transfer of S. The receiver 
then simply forms C2B (modn) to retrieve S. As well as the tremen-
dous advantage gained in terms of speed, there is now no longer any need 
for B to be superincreasing. B could simply be some random permu-
tation of {O, 1, 2, ... ,2k - I}, or perhaps with some repeated elements. 
This also represents a saving in storage space and requires marginally 
less computation to be done in the multiplication of C2 B (mod n). 
Obtaining additional security. 
It is more than likely that a transmitter may never want to send more 
than one of a set of prealTanged subliminal messages, or no subliminal 
message at all. This is especially relevant in the case of treaty com-
pliance outlined in the introduction, where the listening device might 
have only a few possible states. If the number of acceptable subliminal 
messages is small compared with n, then detection of (correctly authen-
ticated) forgeries inserted by some intruder can be accomplished with 
high probability. 
Suppose there are tI valid subliminal messages at some point in time, 
then (pre)assign to each of these tI a distinct class. Now, if an intruder, 
unaware of any subliminal transmission, is able to compromise the au-
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thentication system, then an inserted message will be detected with a 
probability of approximately 1- tI/n (given that the number of elements 
in each class has been made approximately equa.l). Detection will oC<jur 
in exactly those cases where the class into wh~ch the received authenti-
cator falls does not match one of the (pre )arranged subliminal message 
classes. When such a message is received, a change of key is requested of 
the transmitter. There is no need to change the valid 'Subliminal classes 
or their meanings-although (if feasible) this might be preferred. 
It should be noted that the number of elements in each class is (in our 
experience) very uniform, and proving uniformity would be equivalent 
to proving the impossibility of constructing classes with a small number 
of elements. There exist choices of B and n which result in each of 
the classes containing exactly 2k elements, and in these cases, if there 
was a strict protocol between sender and receiver, such that only one 
subliminal response was acceptable at anyone time, then we have a 
'perfect' authentication system as defined by Simmons [6]. That is, the 
probability of successful deception falls to its minimum, l/n. 
Conclusion. 
Modified as above, Seberry's method for subliminal message transfer 
in an authentication without secrecy environment becomes feasible and 
much faster. H additional authentication is implemented using valid 
subliminal classes, then security can also be greatly increased. 
1. Addendum. 
Concurrent with the work of Seberry [2] and received following the 
completion of this work, was that· of Odlyzko [1] which breaks the basic 
Shamir Fast Signature Scheme. Odlyzko shows how to break Shamir's 
basic system (without the random vector R), and this carries directly 
over to the system with the random vector. Basically he solves E~!:l E 
iBi == m(modn) without the need for knowledge of the secret matrix 
H. 
In. either case, some vector, say 0, is received with the message M. 
Odlyzko's method provides some 0' such that 0' A = M. Not sur-
prisingly, some damage is done to our work on the subliminal channel. 
Something may be salvageable, but at the price of restricted operation. 
It is possible to use the subliminal message class for further authenti-
cation, or keep A private. If the subliminal class is used for authenti-
cation, then the system takes on a contrived appearance, whilst if A is 
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kept private we no longer have authentication without secrecy, but just 
authentication. This would not be suitable for the example concerning 
two countries and listening devices since the authenticator could not be 
shown to be so, unless A were revealed' following every message. This 
would probably not be acceptable to either cO,untry. The system could 
however still be used for authentication between two parties who kept 
A secret, but in this case some stronger authentication would probably 
be chosen. 
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